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Abstract
This paper identies necessary and su¢ cient single-prole con-
ditions for consistent decision under all super-majority rules. It is
demonstrated that if one begins by discarding any ordering and its
inverse whenever they are both found in the preference prole, then
the reduced prole will generate a transitive super-majority rule rela-
tion if and only if it is not balanced enough relative to the size of the
super-majority.
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1 Introduction
Consistent decision making under supermajority rules has been neglected by
economic theory in the most ostentatious way. To be fair in this judgement
we should add that all the e¤ort was rightfully directed in the understanding
of the most interesting extreme of the supermajority spectrum; the simple
majority rule. Simple majority has many good properties compared to other
rules (including all other supermajority rules) and therefore conditions that
guarantee its functionality have been sought for and subsequently presented
in the literature (single-peakedness, value restrictedness etc.). This search
though, for conditions that guarantee the well behaving of majority related
Social Welfare Functions (SWF) has practically1 stopped by Inadas (1969)
seminal discourse on the simple majority rule for a seemingly obvious reason.
Inada argues that, as far as the simple majority rule is concerned, Sens
(1966) value-restrictedness condition generates the widest list of individual
preferences that, if a preference prole is formed by a fraction of them, then
a transitive simple majority rule relation is always guaranteed. According
to this interpretation value-restrictedness is both su¢ cient and necessary
for consistency of simple majority decision; no wider condition can ever be
obtained. On the other hand though, we know that a preference prole may
yield a transitive simple majority rule relation and violate at the same time
value-restrictedness.
1There are few recent studies though. See for example Dasgupta and Maskin
(1998,2008).
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This obvious fact points out to an incompatibility between the standard
mathematical meaning of necessity and what Inada denes as such. This
incompatibility is due to a very simple reason. The "input" of a SWF is
a preference prole and not a vector of distinct individual preferences. As
in any other class of functions, if we want to nd necessary and su¢ cient
conditions such that the "output" of a SWF has a certain property (that it
yields a transitive relation in our case) then these conditions should refer to
the "input" of the SWF, that is, on the domain of preference proles and not
on the domain of individual preferences from which a preference prole may
be formed. Single-peakedness and value-restrictedness (and all conditions of
such form) are conditions on the domain of individual preferences that may
form a preference prole and, therefore, restrict the domain of preference
proles not directly but indirectly. For this reason they are very "strong"
conditions and in such distance with the pure mathematical meaning of ne-
cessity. This simple observation allows us to revisit the issue of consistency
of SWFs from the "preference prole domain" perspective and derive new
results.
In particular, this paper will study the whole range of supermajority
SWFs (from simple majority rule to unanimity) and will present necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for the transitivity of any supermajority rule rela-
tion2. These conditions will describe a property that a) a certain preference
2A condition of equivalent nature regarding simple majority rule was proposed by Feld
and Grofman (1983).
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prole should posses in order to yield a transitive supermajority rule rela-
tion (su¢ ciency) and b) if a certain preference prole does not posses this
property then it yields an intransitive supermajority rule relation (necessity).
Our conditions will, thus, describe a single-prole property and will there-
fore allow us to split the universal domain of preference proles in two; the
rst domain of preference proles consists of those who ensure transitivity
and the second consists of those who violate it. We need to stress at this
point that, obviously, these two domains will vary along with the exact su-
permajority rule under study. A preference prole may yield a transitive
social preference relation under some supermajority rule and may yield an
intransitive social preference relation under another one.
2 Analysis
Suppose that there exists a set of individuals N = f1; 2; :::; ng; #N  3
and odd and a nite set of alternatives X, #X = 3. We consider three
alternatives only for simplicity. We will argue later that our results apply
to any arbitrary number of distinct alternatives. Each i 2 N has complete,
transitive and strict (linear) preferences on X which can be represented by
a linear order of the elements of X (any linear order on X is permitted).
Assume that a supermajority SWF is applied to aggregate social prefer-
ences.
Dene the supermajority SWF as follows:
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x  y if #fi 2 N jx i yg > #N+12 + a
y  x if #fi 2 N jy i xg > #N+12 + a
and
x  y otherwise.
where a is a non-negative non-integer number3 such that 0  a  #N 1
2
:
Obviously, a is a measure of the supermajority needed for an alternative to
be preferred to another. We will therefore name as a supermajority the
supermajority rule that requires a votes in excess of simple majority for an
alternative to be socially preferred to another. When a = 0 we are obviously
in the simple majority case and when a = #N 1
2
we are in the unanimity
case.
We dene as  the preference prole of the society N on the set of al-
ternatives X and (i) the linear order which represents the preferences of
individual i 2 N .
Given the environment that is described above, dene the following.
Denition 1 (Mutual Exclusiveness) Individuals i and j are mutually
exclusive in X if and only if for every two distinct x and y from X either
x i y and y j x or y i x and x j y (or, if and only if (i) is the
inverse of (j)).
3Although we assume that a is generically a non-integer (for simplication of our analy-
sis) we allow the value 0 (simple majority) and the value #N 12 (unanimity rule). Our
proof will perfectly work for these specic two integers.
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Denition 2 (Reduced Population) Given a set of alternatives X, a
reduced population ~N is a subset of N that a) does not include any mutually
exclusive individuals in X and b) Nn ~N is either the union of #Nn ~N
2
disjoint
pairs of mutually exclusive individuals or empty.
SinceNn ~N contains individuals that, in pairs, cancel out each other votes,
it easily follows that if #fi 2 N jx i yg > #N+12 + a then #fi 2 ~N jx i
yg > # ~N+1
2
+ a and vice versa for any ~N . This allows us to re-phrase the
denition of the majority rule in the following way:
x  y if #fi 2 ~N jx i yg > # ~N+12 + a
y  x if #fi 2 ~N jy i xg > # ~N+12 + a
and
x  y otherwise.
Denition 3 (Reduced Preference Prole) The reduced preference
prole of , r(), is the preference prole of any reduced population ~N (it
is trivial to see that the preference proles of all reduced populations are
identical).
Denition 4 (Relative Balancedness) A preference prole  is bal-
anced relative to the a supermajority rule if and only if:
i) each x 2 X is ranked at the top and at the bottom of (i) for less than
# ~N+1
2
+ a individuals i 2 ~N in the reduced population and
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ii) at least one x 2 X is ranked at the top and at the bottom of (i) for
less than #
~N 1
2
  a individuals i 2 ~N in the reduced population.
Before stating and proving the main result of this paper we will argue that
the set of orderings in the reduced prole (we will call it s()) has at most
three elements for any prole . Let L denote the set of all linear orderings on
X. There will be six of them, and we can partition L into three two-element
sets, each consisting of an ordering and its inverse. Let S be any subset
of L consisting of four or more orderings. Then it excludes orderings from
at most two of the members of the partition, leaving at least one ordering-
inverse pair contained in S, which cannot therefore be the set of orderings for
a reduced prole. Thus, for any prole  we have s() = fR;Q; V g, possibly
with R = Q, or even R = Q = V .
We can now state the theorem.
Theorem An arbitrary preference prole  yields a transitive a supermajority
rule relation if and only if it violates relative balancedness.
Proof Let  be an arbitrary prole. (1) Suppose that  is balanced
relative to the a supermajority rule (relative balancedness satised).
Then s() cannot consist out of a unique linear order. To prove that
imagine that it does. Then we have two cases. Either # ~N > #
~N+1
2
+ a or
# ~N < #
~N+1
2
+a: In the rst case the condition (i) of relative balancedness is
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violated while in the second case the condition (ii) of relative balancedness
is violated (this is because # ~N < #
~N+1
2
+ a implies #
~N 1
2
  a < 0 and all
elements of X appear at least zero times as best and worst in r()).
If s() is composed out of two linear orders then s() may take one of the
three following forms:
a)
R Q
x y
y x
z z
b)
R Q
x z
y x
z y
c)
R Q
x x
y z
z y
d)
R Q
x y
y z
z x
Observe that in cases a) and c) non violation of (i) means # ~N < #
~N+1
2
+a
and therefore #
~N 1
2
 a < 0; violation of (ii) since all elements of s() appear
rst (and last) at least one time. Lets focus now on b) (the arguments
for d) are equivalent). Non violation of (i) implies x  z and y  z. If
# ~N < #
~N+1
2
+ a then #
~N 1
2
  a < 0; we have violation of (ii) since all
elements of s() appear rst (and last) at least one time. Therefore, for both
(i) and (ii) to be satised we should have # ~N > #
~N+1
2
+ a: This implies that
# ~N 1
2
  a > 0 and, indeed, violation of (ii) becomes impossible since x (y)
appears last (rst) zero times. In this case x  y; intransitivity.
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If s() consists out of three linear orders, without loss of generality, it
may take one of the two following forms4:
a)
R Q V
x x y
y z x
z y z
b)
R Q V
x z y
y x z
z y x
Lets focus on a) rst. Condition (i) of relative balancedness implies that
~n(R)+~n(Q) < #
~N+1
2
+a and therefore that ~n(V ) > #
~N 1
2
 a and that x  y:
Moreover, condition (i) of relative balancedness implies that ~n(R) + ~n(V ) <
# ~N+1
2
+ a and therefore that ~n(Q) > #
~N 1
2
  a and that y  z: Thus, by
condition (ii) we should have that ~n(R) < #
~N 1
2
  a which implies that
~n(Q) + ~n(V ) > #
~N+1
2
+ a and that x  z (intransitivity).
Now lets focus on b). Assume without loss of generality that ~n(R) <
# ~N 1
2
  a (condition (ii)). Then ~n(Q) + ~n(V ) > # ~N+1
2
+ a and z  x: We
now have to distinguish between two cases; ~n(Q) < #
~N 1
2
  a and ~n(Q) >
# ~N 1
2
  a. We will solve only for the rst case as a symmetric argument is
valid for the second as well. If ~n(Q) < #
~N 1
2
 a then ~n(R)+~n(V ) > # ~N+1
2
+a
4This is due to the fact that s() cannot be composed of linear orders that have common
intermediate elements.
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and y  z: If ~n(V ) < # ~N 1
2
  a then ~n(R) + ~n(Q) > # ~N+1
2
+ a and x  y
(intransitivity). If ~n(V ) > #
~N 1
2
 a then ~n(R)+~n(Q) < # ~N+1
2
+a and x  y
(intransitivity).
We have proven that when  is balanced relative to the a supermajority
rule then the a supermajority rule relation is intransitive.
(2) Now suppose  is not balanced relative to the a supermajority rule
(relative balancedness violated).
Note that violation of relative balancedness means violation of at least
one of conditions (i) and (ii) and not necessarily both.
If (i) is violated then independently of the number of elements of s()
we must have that some x 2 X appears rst (or last) more than # ~N+1
2
+ a
times in r(). Therefore we have that #fi 2 ~N jx i yg > # ~N+12 + a and
#fi 2 ~N jx i zg > # ~N+12 +a (or with < if it appears last) which means that
x  y and that x  z (or y  x; z  x if it appears last). Transitivity is
guaranteed independently of the social preference relation between y and z.
If (i) is not violated and (ii) is violated we observe that s() should be
composed out of two or three distinct linear orders. If (i) is not violated and
s() is composed out of one linear order then (by non violation of (i)) we
have # ~N < #
~N+1
2
+ a which implies that #
~N 1
2
  a < 0; non violation of (ii).
If (i) is not violated and s() is composed out of two linear orders then
s() may take one of the three following forms:
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a)
R Q
x y
y x
z z
b)
R Q
x z
y x
z y
c)
R Q
x x
y z
z y
d)
R Q
x y
y z
z x
Observe that in cases a) and c) non violation of (i) means # ~N < #
~N+1
2
+a
and therefore #
~N 1
2
  a < 0; violation of (ii). We observe that in such a case
we have x  y  z  x; transitivity. Lets focus on b) (as in the part (1) of
the proof the arguments for d) are equivalent). Non violation of (i) implies
x  z and y  z. If # ~N < # ~N+1
2
+ a and therefore #
~N 1
2
  a < 0 we have
violation of (ii) since all elements of s() appear rst (and last) at least one
time. In this case x  y and transitivity is guaranteed. If # ~N > # ~N+1
2
+ a
then #
~N 1
2
  a > 0 and therefore violation of (ii) becomes impossible since x
(y) appears last (rst) zero times.
If (i) is not violated and s() is composed out of three linear orders then
s(); as in part (1) of the proof, may take one of the two following forms:
a)
R Q V
x x y
y z x
z y z
b)
R Q V
x z y
y x z
z y x
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Lets focus on a) rst. Non violation of (i) implies x  y and y  z. If
# ~N < #
~N+1
2
+ a and therefore #
~N 1
2
  a < 0 we have violation of (ii) since
all elements of s() appear rst (and last) at least one time. In this case
x  z; transitivity. If # ~N > # ~N+1
2
+ a then #
~N 1
2
  a > 0 and therefore
violation of (ii) becomes impossible since x (z) appears last (rst) zero times.
Finally, lets examine case b). Violation of (ii) means that ~n(R) > #
~N 1
2
  a;
~n(Q) > #
~N 1
2
  a and ~n(V ) > # ~N 1
2
  a: Therefore, ~n(Q) + ~n(V ) = # ~N  
~n(R) < # ~N # ~N 1
2
+a = #
~N+1
2
+a and equivalently, ~n(R)+~n(V ) < #
~N+1
2
+a
and ~n(R) + ~n(Q) < #
~N+1
2
+ a: This means that x  z; y  z and x  y;
transitivity. QED
Finally, we must stress that because transitivity requires focusing on
triples of alternatives, the result presented here applies immediately to cases
where X has four or more alternatives. Of course, it is essential to point
out that the denition of relative balancedness for an arbitrary triple A  X
must apply to the restriction of the prole  to A. So (i) and (j) need not
be inverses of each other, but if the restriction of (i) to A is the inverse of
the restriction of (j) to A, then both are eliminated when constructing the
reduced prole r(; A) for the triple A.
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3 Concluding remarks
Recent literature on majority decisions has been, mainly, focused in providing
characterizations of the majority rule (e.g. Campbell and Kelly, 2000) and in
identifying its "good" properties (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2008). The present
paper, reviews the issue of transitivity of the majority rule and establishes a
unique necessary and su¢ cient condition. By introducing the concept of the
reduced population for every set of alternatives, we can now easily approach
the problem, from an economically meaningful way.
The idea for the result is simple, and based on construction or elimination
of Condorcet cycles. As far as triplets of alternatives (x; y; z) are concerned,
the above condition states that one of the three alternatives in (x; y; z) is
either strictly preferred to the other two, or strictly worse than the other
two, for a majority of voters, after eliminating any pair of voters that have
exactly o¤setting preference orderings. It is easy to see that, if the identied
condition holds for any triplet (x; y; z), majority voting implies transitivity
almost by construction, because there is an alternative that is worst or best
in any pairwise comparison with the two other alternatives. Therefore, it
must be that pairwise majority voting generates transitive preferences.
For the counterpart, one can show that if there exists such a triplet for
which none of the alternatives is ranked rst or last by a majority of voters of
the reduced population, then this triplet can be used to construct a Condorcet
cycle. This argument follows from the observation that after eliminating
13
o¤-setting (mutually exclusive) voters from considerations, at most three
di¤erent proles remain. If there are only one or two proles, transitivity is
guaranteed, so lack of transitivity requires three proles, and they must form
a Condorcet cycle. The result is then immediate.
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